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FROM THE COCKPIT TO THE NURSING HOME: A
LOOK AT THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE LAW CONCERNING THE AGE-60 RULE
SHAWN THOMAS WELLS
THE HISTORY OF THE AGE-60 RULE: WHERE WE'VE BEEN
W ITH THE development of the commercial airlines
during the early part of the twentieth century, federal
regulation of the aviation industry had its genesis in the
1930's when the Civil Aeronautics Authority (predecessor
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)) established
standards for airline pilots.' These stardards were
designed to protect both the pilots and the traveling pub-
lic. 2 The regulatory agency's initial regulations stipulated
mandatory retirement for airline pilots failing to meet
requisite physical standards. The FAA, however, did not
propose implementation of a mandatory retirement age
until 1959. 3 On March 15, 1960, despite opposition from
various industry-related groups,4 the FAA promulgated
an industry regulation (the "Age-60 Rule") banning pilots
I Karl M. Ruppenthal, Compulsory Retirement of Airline Pilots, 14 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 528 (1961).
2 Id.
Id. at 528-29. In fact, during the early development of the airline industry, the
age of the pilot was not considered relevant to flight safety. Id.
Interestingly, although the FAA invited comments on the proposed regula-
tion, hearings to discuss the ramifications of such regulations were never sched-
uled. Id. at 535. In response to the FAA proposal, the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) filed a brief, asserting, among other contentions, that the Administrator
of the FAA did not possess the power or authority to issue the proposed regula-
tions. Id. Additionally, ALPA alleged that the regulations imposed limitations on
pilots' professional and property rights without affording them the opportunity
for a full evidentiary hearing and therefore violated due process of law. Id.
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over the age of sixty from flying. 5 While the Age-60 Rule
has existed in various forms since its inception, 6 the cur-
rent regulation continues to prohibit individuals sixty
years of age or older from piloting large commercial
aircraft.7
In support of the regulation, the FAA originally relied
on medical studies which indicated that "sudden incapaci-
tation due to heart attacks or strokes become more fre-
quent as men approach age sixty and present medical
knowledge is such that it is impossible to predict with ac-
curacy those individuals most likely to suffer attacks. ' 8
The FAA also pointed to increased risk posed by the
growing number of pilots aged sixty and older. The FAA
emphasized that older pilots, due to their seniority under
Id. at 536-37.
6 R. Micheal Kasperzak, Jr., Comment, Mandatory Retirement of Airline Pilots: An
Analysis of the FAA's Age 60 Retirement Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1981).
7 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1991). The regulation states, in relevant part:
(a) No certificate holder may use any person as an airman nor may
any person serve as an airman unless that person -
(1) Holds an appropriate current airman certificate issued by the
FAA;
(2) Has any required appropriate current airman and medical certifi-
cates in his possession while engaged in operations under this part;
and
(3) Is otherwise qualified for the operation for which he is to be
used.
(b) Each airman covered by paragraph (a)(2) of this section shall
present either or both certificates for inspection upon the request of
the Administrator.
(c) No certificate holder may use the services of any person as a pilot
on an airplane engaged in operations under this part if that person
has reached his 60th birthday. No person may serve as a pilot on an
airplane engaged in operations under this part if that person has
reached his 60th birthday.
Id. § 121.383(a)-(c) (1991).
8 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960).
More specifically, the FAA stated that (1) aging causes deterioration of important
physiological and psychological functions largely due to degenerative arterioscle-
rosis; (2) because the aging process affects each person differently, the effects of
the aging process on any one individual cannot be predicted; (3) degeneration
due to the aging process accelerates during the later stages of life; and (4) age
degeneration often results in sudden incapacitation, disabling an individual with-
out warning. Kasperzak, supra note 6, at 244-45.
then-existing collective bargaining agreements, often flew
the newest and fastest planes.9 Recently, one court re-ex-
amined the FAA's safety justifications for the regulation
and noted that the FAA reaffirmed the Age-60 Rule in
1972 and 1984 after finding that advanced age may ad-
versely affect pilot safety and that then-available tests
could not reliably predict adverse effects in individual
cases. 10
From its inception, however, the Age-60 Rule has been
subject to harsh criticism. In fact, inJanuary 1960, before
the rule went into effect, the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) brought suit against the administrator of the FAA
in response to the proposed rule." ALPA sought a de-
claratory judgment rendering the regulation null and
void, and further sought injunctive relief against its
threatened application. 12 The association alleged that, by
terminating a pilot's right to command planes in commer-
cial service after age sixty, the regulation deprived pilots
of their property rights in their licenses without due pro-
cess of law.13 Furthermore, ALPA alleged that the regula-
tion was invalid because the FAA issued it without holding
adjudicatory hearings as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act14 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.15
ALPA insisted that the regulation "was arbitrary, discrimi-
natory and without reasonable relation to the standards
set forth" in the Federal Aviation Act. 16 The trial court
denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction
and reserved judgment on the defendant Administrator's
cross motion for summary judgment. 17 The plaintiffs
appealed.
Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898.
EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 222
(1988).
" Quesada, 276 F.2d at 892.
12 Id. at 894.
1.4 Id.
14 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1011 (1988).
- 49 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (1958).
- Quesada, 276 F.2d at 894.
17 Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.' 8 Holding that the
Age-60 Rule did not violate due process, the court noted
that administrative regulations often limit the use that
persons may make of their property without affording
those persons an opportunity to present evidence con-
cerning the fairness of the regulation.19 The court further
stated that, because the restrictions imposed upon the pi-
lots were not overly stringent in relation to the public in-
terest to be served, the limitations set forth in the FAA
regulations were entirely reasonable.2
Additionally, the court held that the FAA properly is-
sued the directive in accordance with the rule-making re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, thereby
rejecting ALPA's contention that the FAA violated the ad-
judicatory hearing requirements mandated by the Act.2'
Emphasizing the considerable data reviewed by the FAA
while formulating the Age-60 Rule, the court affirmed
the trial court's decision denying the preliminary
injunction.2 3
Having survived this initial challenge, the Age-60 Rule
has withstood further rigorous litigation, much of which
had been based on alleged violations of provisions of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) .2' The thrust of the ADEA25 is best understood




2 Id. at 898.
2.3 Id.
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
2 The ADEA provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individuals age; or
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in terms of its three major goals: 1) the employment of
persons based on ability rather than age; 2) the prohibi-
tion of arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and 3)
assistance in solving problems arising from the impact of
age on employment. 6
Although the ADEA offers broad protection against
age-based discrimination to individuals between the ages
of forty and seventy, Congress carved out several impor-
tant exceptions which seriously limit the potential effect of
the ADEA.27  Significantly, the ADEA's prohibition
against age discrimination does not apply in circum-
stances where the employer can demonstrate that age is a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)21 - a factor
that an employer considers to be a requirement of the
job.29
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.
Id. § 623(a).
26William J. Duensing, Case Comment, EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing Co.: Choice
of a Test for Coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1145,
1148 (1984).
27 Cheryl H. Raper, Comment, Age Discrimination in the Airline Industry: Is Age a
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification for the Position of Pilot?, 55J. AIR L. & COM. 543,
555-56 (1989).
'8The ADEA specifically states that an employer may discriminate on the basis
of age:
(1) where age is bona fide occupational qualification reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age, or
where such practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign
country, and compliance with such subsections would cause such
employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to violate
the laws of the country in which such workplace is located;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension or insur-
ance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this
chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority system or em-
ployee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retire-
ment of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title
because of the age of such individual; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good
cause.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f).
2-, Kasperzak, supra note 6, at 251 n.93.
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The Supreme Court Glances Over the Rule: Western Airlines Inc.
v. Criswell
The United States Supreme Court analyzed the Age-60
Rule in light of the ADEA in Western Airlines Inc. v. Cris-
well,30 wherein two airline pilot captains over the age of
sixty brought suit against their employer, Western Air-
lines, after Western denied each pilot's application for re-
assignment to the position of flight engineer.' Under a
collective bargaining agreement between Western and the
pilots' union, members of the cockpit crew could obtain
open positions through a bidding process wherein prefer-
ence was to be given to senior members of the cockpit
crew.3 2 The pilots sued on the ground that Western vio-
lated the ADEA by applying the Age-60 Rule to the posi-
tion of flight engineer.3
At trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the pilot-
plaintiffs. The district court noted that although the flight
engineer plays a critical role in emergency situations, the
flight engineer's "normal duties" are not as crucial to
flight safety as those of the pilot.3 4 Furthermore, the
court granted the plaintiffs equitable relief, noting that it
found no merit in Western's BFOQ defense to its adher-
ence to the mandatory retirement rule.35
3o 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
., Id. at 405. A career flight engineer forced to retire on his sixtieth birthday
was also among the named plaintiffs seeking damages on similar grounds. Id.
. Id. at 404.
3. Id. at 405-06. In its opinion, the Supreme Court outlined the respective du-
ties of the members of the cockpit crew of the Boeing 727 and the McDonnell-
Douglas DC-10:
These aircraft [the Boeing 727 and the McDonnell Douglas DC-10]
require three crew members in the cockpit; a captain, a first officer,
and a flight engineer. The "captain" is the pilot and controls the
aircraft. He is responsible for all phases of its operation. The "first
officer" is the copilot and assists the captain. The "flight engineer"
usually monitors a side-facing instrument panel. He does not oper-
ate the flight controls unless the captain and the first officer become
incapacitated.
Id. at 403 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 114
(1985)).
14 Id. at 406.
. Id. at 408. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury "that the 'BFOQ
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The court of appeals affirmed the decision, specifically
rejecting Western's contention that "the instruction on
the BFOQ defense was insufficiently deferential to the air-
line's legitimate concern for the safety of its passen-
gers.''36 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the merits of Western's
contention.3 7
In its analysis, the Supreme Court reviewed much of the
legislative history of the original ADEA as well as the
amendments added in 1978, noting that the policies and
substantive provisions of the ADEA apply with special
force in the case of mandatory retirement provisions.3
The Court quoted a task committee on education and la-
bor report with approval, noting:
Increasingly, it is being recognized that mandatory retire-
ment based solely upon age is arbitrary and that chrono-
logical age alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform a
job. Mandatory retirement does not take into considera-
tion actual differing abilities and capacities. Such forced
retirement can cause hardships for older persons through
loss of roles and loss of income. Those older persons who
defense is available only if it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation or
essence of defendant's business' [and] that 'the essence of Western's business is
the safe transportation of their passengers.' " Id. at 407 (quoting the trial court's
jury instructions). The district court further instructed the jury:
One method by which defendant Western may establish a BFOQ in
this case is to prove:
(1) That in 1978, when these plaintiffs were retired, it was highly
impractical for Western to deal with each second officer over age 60
on an individualized basis to determine his particular ability to per-
form his job safely; and
(2) That some second officers over age 60 possess traits of a physio-
logical, psychological or other nature which preclude safe and effi-
cient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means other
than knowing their age.
In evaluating the practicality to defendant Western of dealing with
second officers over age 60 on an individualized basis, with respect
to the medical testimony, you should consider the state of the medi-
cal art as it existed in July 1978.
Id. at 407-08 (quoting the district court's jury instructions).
.- Id. at 408.
37 Id.
- Id. at 410.
19921
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wish to be re-employed have a much more difficult time
finding a new job than younger persons.
Society, as a whole suffers from mandatory retirement
as well. As a result of mandatory retirement, skills and ex-
perience are lost from the work force resulting in reduced
GNP. Such practices also add a burden to Government
income maintenance programs such as social security. 9
Importantly, the Court also recognized that classifica-
tion based on age could sometimes serve as a necessary
proxy for neutral employment qualifications essential to
an employer's business. 40 To account for such situations,
the Court noted, Congress borrowed a concept from Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196441 which provides that
such a classification is lawful where age is a BFOQ.42 The
Court emphasized, however, that the Secretary of Labor
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) declared that the BFOQ exception to the ADEA
should be limited as to its scope and application and con-
strued narrowly.43 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
adopted such a narrow construction.
The Court noted that as the party asserting an affirma-
tive defense, the employer has the burden of proving the
applicability of the BFOQexception in age-based employ-
ment discrimination cases. 44 For purposes of evaluating a
BFOQ defense to an age-based qualification purportedly
justified by safety considerations, the Supreme Court
adopted the two-part test enunciated by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.45
The first prong of the two-part test requires an employer
to objectively show that any discriminatory hiring prac-
tices are reasonably necessary to the essence of the em-
11 Id. at 410-11 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2
(1977)).
,, Id. at 411.
4, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(3)(1).
2 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 412.
4.1 Id.
44 Id. at 416 n.24.
45 Id. at 416-17 (citing Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
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ployer's business.46 In businesses where safety is a major
consideration (as measured by the likelihood and severity
of harm in the event of an accident), an employer may re-
quire restrictive job qualifications in order to further the
interest of public safety.47
The second prong of the test "requires that age qualifi-
cations be something more than 'convenient' or 'reason-
able'; they must be 'reasonably necessary . . . to the
particular business' and this is only so when the employer
is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for the safety-re-
lated job qualifications validated in the first inquiry. 48
The second prong of the test can itself be met in one of
two ways. First, the employer can meet the burden by es-
tablishing it has a factual basis for believing that substan-
tially all persons over a specified age would not be able to
perform the duties of the job in a safe and efficient man-
ner.49 Alternatively, the employer can also establish that
age serves as a legitimate proxy for the safety-related job
qualification by showing that it is "impossible or highly
impractical" to consider each older worker on an individ-
ual basis. °
Having adopted the two part test as prescribed by the
court in Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., the Supreme Court af-
firmed the appellate court's decision. Significantly, the
Court rejected Western's contention that because flight
engineers must meet the same stringent qualifications as
pilots, Western could rightfully extend the FAA's Age-60
Rule to include flight engineers.5 ' The Court stated that
46 Id. at 413.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 414 (quoting Weeks v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1969)).
411 Id.
Id. With regard to meeting the second alternative, the Supreme Court fur-
ther noted: "'[Olne method by which the employer can carry this burden is to
establish that some members of the discriminated-against class possess a trait pre-
cluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means
other than knowledge of the applicant's membership in the class.' " Id. at 414-15
(quoting Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d at 235).
- Id. at 418.
19921 763
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"[t]he extent to which the rule is probative varies with the
weight of the evidence supporting its safety rationale and
'the congruity between the ... occupations at issue.' "52
Having noted that the evidence clearly established that
Western, as well as the FAA, recognized that the qualifica-
tions for a flight engineer are less rigorous than those re-
quired for a pilot,53 the court upheld the lower court's
54decisions.
Recent Developments in the Law: Where We Are Going
The Age-60 Rule celebrated its thirtieth birthday in
1990. Just how many more birthday celebrations the Age-
60 Rule will enjoy is not certain in light of several recent
developments which may further limit the purview of the
regulation or perhaps eliminate it altogether.
On October 19, 1989, Congressman James Lightfoot
(R-Iowa) introduced a bill which would raise the
mandatory retirement age of pilots to age sixty-five.55
The bill proposes to amend section 602(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 195856 by adding the following paragraph
to the end of the Act's current provisions:
(3) Limitation on Age Restrictions. - The Administrator
shall not, solely by reason of the age of a person, if such
person is less than 65 years of age -
(A) refuse to issue an airman certificate to, or refuse to
renew such certificate for, such person, if such person is
applying for the issuance or renewal of such certificate in
order to serve or continue to serve as a pilot of an aircraft;
or
(B) require an air carrier to terminate the employment of,
or refuse to employ, such person as a pilot on an aircraft
of such air carrier.
.- Id. (quoting Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 4,72 U.S. 353, 371 (1985)).
5. Id.
.4 Id. at 423.
H.R. 3498, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
49 U.S.C. § 1422(b) (1988).
57 H.R. 3498.
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The OTA Report and its Impact
After Lightfoot introduced this legislation, the House
Public Works and Transportation Investigations and
Oversight Subcommittee requested that the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) review the medical as-
pects pertaining to the Age-60 Rule.58 The OTA re-
sponded by preparing a report, released by the House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation in mid-
September 199O. 5 Importantly, the report reaches no
conclusion as to whether the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion should abandon its controversial Age-60 Rule.60
Rather, the report merely discusses several key areas im-
pacting the aviation industry, including statistical data re-
garding pilot performance and age, various medical
screening technologies, and the cost of such medical
programs.61
One interesting point noted in the report is the rela-
tionship between pilot age and the number of aviation ac-
cidents attributed to pilots within specific age categories.
The report compares the accident rates of pilots in age
groups divided into ten-year intervals.62 Importantly, the
report concludes that "[p]ilots between the ages of 60 and
-1 Perry Bradley, Recent and Total Flight Time Have Stronger Influence on Accidents
Than Age Alone, OTA Report Concludes, AIR SAFETY WK., Sept. 24, 1990, at 1.
-" OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE AGE 60
RULE FOR AIRLINE PILOTS (1990) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
'-' Bradley, supra note 58, at 1.
61 OTA REPORT, supra note 59, attachment I (technical analysis by Robert Mc-
Donough, M.D.).
6 d. fig. 3. Specifically, the number of accidents per 100,000 pilot hours is
compared to pilots in the age intervals of 17-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-
69, and 70 and over. Id. The data is further analyzed by graphing the accident
rates corresponding with three varying levels of recent pilot experience: 5 1-100
hours/year; 101-400 hours/year; and 401 hours and above. Id. The data demon-
strate that:
[t]he beneficial effect of recent flying experience exists at all levels,
but there is no interaction with age in pilots flying less than 100
[hours per year]. In pilots who fly more than 100 [hours per year],
increasing age (and probably total experience) and increased recent
flying time both have beneficial effects. After the age of 60, accident
rates increase even if pilots continue to fly over 400 hours per year.
76519921
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69 years have an accident rate that is 2.1 times higher than
the accident rate for the 50 to 59 year olds, but lower than
for pilots in the 30 to 39 year old and 20 to 29 year old
age groups.1 63
But what causes these aviation accidents to occur? One
study, conducted by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), indicated that failures in pilot or co-pilot
performance were implicated in 40% of a total of 434 ac-
cidents occurring between 1968-1970 and 63% of the fa-
tal accidents that occurred during that same time
period.64 In fact, in the majority of accidents in which fail-
ure of pilot performance constituted a causative factor of
the accident, mental error, as opposed to medical impair-
ment or incapacitation, was to blame.65
Interestingly, in cases where pilot impairment or inca-
pacitation actually occurs, no single cause is attributable
to such impairment or incapacitation. In fact, of the 67
episodes of pilot incapacitation which occurred on United
States air carriers during the period from 1965-1974, the
causes of only 33 are known.66 Of the known causes, car-
diovascular disease accounted for twelve episodes of inca-
pacitation, while gastroenteritis accounted for six. 67 With
respect to general aviation pilots, alcohol accounted for
approximately 70% of the episodes of incapacitation or
impairment for which there was a known cause, while car-
diovascular disease accounted for one-third of the non-
Id. attach.l (technical analysis by Robert S. McDonough, M.D.).
- Id. at 2.
i Id. at 2-3. The report also notes that:
[a] study detailing the types of failures in pilot performance that con-
tributed to accidents showed that they were due to decision and
judgment factors such as failure to follow approved procedures and
directives, failure to see and avoid other aircraft, attempted opera-




67 Id. The remaining causes of the episodes of incapacitation can be broken
down as follows: convulsive seizures - fiveepisodes; kidney stone attack - four
episodes; "faintness" - two episodes; and chest pain, sinus attack, cervical strain,
and pneumonia attack each accounting for one episode of incapacitation. Id.
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alcohol related episodes of incapacitation or
impairment.68
The report also demonstrates that medical illness
among pilots increases with age. This conclusion is based
on the annual "denial rates" for airline pilot medical certi-
fication. 69 In 1987-1988, the annual denial rate for airline
pilots ranged from a rate of 1.0 per 1,000 in the 25-29 age
group to 16.2 per 1,000 in the 55-59 age group. 70 The
report indicates that the majority of denials of medical
certification are due to cardiovascular and neuropsychia-
tric diseases, which include convulsive reactions, distur-
bances of consciousness, neuroses, alcoholism and the
like. 7' Although these diseases rarely result in disqualifi-
cation before the age of forty-five, the denial rate in-
creases significantly thereafter.72
The OTA Report also makes specific reference to a con-
gressionally mandated study (1981 Report) of the Age-60
Rule completed by the National Institute of Aging (NIA)
in August, 198 1.73 For purposes of the 1981 Report, the
NIA commissioned the Institute of Medicine of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (IOM) to study the merits of
the Age-60 Rule.74  Although the NIA panel recom-
mended that the FAA retain the Age-60 Rule, the NIA did
suggest that the FAA or another federal agency collect
and analyze medical and performance data in order to de-
"" Id.
Id. FAA regulations state:
Any person who is denied a medical certificate by an aviation medi-
cal examiner may, within 30 days after the day of denial, apply in
writing ... for reconsideration of that denial. If he does not apply
for reconsideration during the 30-day period after the date of the
denial, he is considered to have withdrawn his application for a med-
ical certificate.
14 C.F.R. § 67.27(a) (1991).
71 OTA REPORT, supra note 59, at 3-4.
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termine whether the Age-60 Rule could be relaxed. 75 The
FAA, however, ultimately decided to leave the Age-60
Rule untouched.
Suggestions In the OTA Report
Nevertheless, the OTA made several suggestions
(which are detailed in the report) as to how the various
medical examinations required for Class I pilot certifica-
tion may be improved in light of recent advances in medi-
cal standards and diagnostic technology.76 The OTA's
suggestions are intended to supplement those recommen-
dations made by the IOM in 1981. 77 The OTA Report
specifically states:
Any changes that are ultimately made in the medical certi-
fication standards must be determined by weighing a
number of factors, including FAA's mandate to provide
the highest standard of airline passenger safety, the costs
of a more complete medical examination process (includ-
ing the costs of follow-up of positive screening test re-
sults), the risks to pilots inherent in screening (such as
radiation exposure from radiographic examinations), and
the predictive value of a screening test in a largely asymp-
tomatic population with low prevalence of disease.78
Of particular note are the OTA's recommendations as
to the testing of the mental status of a pilot. Currently,
FAA regulations set forth various mental and neurological
disorders which may prohibit a pilot from obtaining the
necessary medical certification. 79  The report recom-
7.5 Id. at 5.
FAA ultimately declined to collect medical and performance data on
commercial pilots over the age of 60 because (1) collecting such data
under conditions of actual operational stress and fatigue would in-
troduce an unacceptable safety risk to the public, and (2) according
to FAA's Office of Chief Counsel, granting exemptions to over-60
pilots participating in the study would make it impossible to justify
denying exemptions to over-60 pilots not involved in the study.
ld.
76 OTA Report, supra note 59, at 6-11.
7 Id. at 6.
7 Id.
79 See 14 C.R.R. § 67.13(d)(1991). With respect to debilitating mental condi-
mends the implementation of formalized testing of the
cognitive function, while also suggesting that the "FAA
develop and validate neuropsychiatric tests that can more
readily detect more subtle age-related decrements in cog-
nitive function that may interfere with pilot performance.
These tests would be administered by clinical psycholo-
gists who are skilled at test administration, scoring, and
interpretation. "80
When addressing the neuropsychological impairments
of pilot performance, the OTA Report recognizes that ad-
vances in technology have occurred in recent years which
have substantially improved the ability of experts to de-
tect conditions which might affect pilot performance. a '
Importantly, however, the OTA concluded that because
the majority of failures in pilot performance are due to
pilot error as opposed to pilot impairment and incapacita-
tion due to medical illness, the suggested improvements
in screening for medical illnesses affecting pilot perform-
ance would have a limited impact on the pilot accident
rates.8 2 The OTA Report strongly states that "[e]ven as-
suming that we [the OTA] were able to organize a battery
of tests that would perfectly predict the risk of developing
medical illnesses that would have incapacitation and im-
pairment, this would have a small impact on pilot accident
rates."8 " In making this conclusion, the OTA relies on the
tions, the FAA regulations provide that the FAA may deny first-class medical certi-
fication to any pilot who has a medical history or clinical diagnosis of a psychosis,
alcoholism, drug dependence, or any severe personality disorder which has mani-
fested itself by overt acts. Id. Moreover, the regulations set forth a "catch-all"
category wherein the FAA may refuse to grant medical certification if the FAA
establishes that a pilot possesses any personality disorder, neurosis, or other
mental condition which prohibits the pilot from safely lerforming his duties. Id.
With regard to neurological conditions, the regulations set foith epilepsy and a
disturbance of consciousness without satisfactory medical explanation of the
cause as specific grounds for denying first-class medical certification. Id. More-
over, any other convulsive disorder, disturbance of consciousness, or neurological
condition which prevents a pilot from safely performing his duties may also serve
as grounds for denial of a first-class medical certification. Id.
so OTA Report, supra note 59, at 10.
" Id. at 11.
2 Id.
- Id.
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data demonstrating an increase in accident rates in the
over-60 age group as compared to the 50-59 year old age
group, which, according to the OTA, "suggest[s] that the
increase in accident rates in the over-60 age group may be
due to a subtle age-related deterioration in cognitive
function (information processing and intellectual func-
tioning) that is of sufficient severity to interfere with pi-
lots' performance and outweigh gains in experience in
this group. ' 84 Thus, the OTA recommends the develop-
ment of neuropsychological tests designed to detect dec-
rements in cognitive performance which must be
validated as a gauge of future pilot performance.85
Should all of the tests recommended by the OTA be
given at the specified intervals, the OTA estimates that an
additional cost of $714 per pilot tested would be incurred
each year.8 6 The report also discusses the costs of con-
firming and following up those tests yielding positive re-
sults. 87  The costs of such follow up of positive test
results, the OTA estimates, would likely more than
double the costs of screening.88
1I Id. The report states that: "Component processes that may influence func-
tion include memory, increased time to process information, motor reaction time,
attention, judgment and decision-making capacity, problem-solving, intellectual
capacity, abstract thinking, learning new skills, control of impulses and emotions,
and personality and character changes." Id.
d.
- Id. at 11-12.
87 Id. at 12. The report also notes:
[O]ne would expect a larger proportion of erroneous positive
screening results for screening tests performed on an asymptomatic
population than for a popbulation of individuals with signs and
symptoms suggestive of disease. Moreover, the inherently adver-
sarial nature of the medical certification process provides a disincen-
tive for pilots to admit symptoms. Id.
"" Id. The report further reveals several other economic issues which are not
addressed in detail by the OTA. Such issues include:
Training - Every pilot promotion or retirement has multiple effects
on training within an airline. For example, if a pilot flying an air-
line's largest aircraft leaves, the airline must provide additional
training to each pilot that moves up to a different aircraft. The mul-
tiplying effect in this case is at least as large as the number of aircraft
types in the airline's fleet.
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The Age-60 Rule Faces the Courts
In addition to the legislation sponsored by Congress-
man Lightfoot, the Age-60 Rule has recently been under
attack in the courts. A serious challenge was mounted in
two interrelated Seventh Circuit cases, Aman v. FAA 89 and
Baker v. FAA. 90 Although the Age-60 Rule survived this
most recent judicial scrutiny, the Rule is now arguably in
its weakest and most vulnerable state since its enactment
in 1960.
In Aman, twenty-eight pilots, each employed by a major
airline as either a captain or a flight engineer, appealed an
FAA decision denying their petition 9 for exemption from
the Age-60 Rule.92  The FAA originally denied the re-
quested exemptions on September 8, 1987, "finding that
[the] granting [of] individualized exemptions under the
petitioners' standards would not ensure the level of safety
Salaries - Senior pilots have significantly higher salaries than junior
pilots.
Labor contracts - Pilots' union retirement (and other collective bar-
gaining) agreements are based on mandatory end of pilot service at
age 60.
Legal action - Some pilots disqualified by new screening procedures
may sue on the basis of discrimination especially if the new tests
have high error rates.
Id.
856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988).
917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1338 (1991).
Importantly, the pilots' petition for exemption included recommendations
from a six-member "Age 60 Exemption Panel"
comprising five physicians and a psychologist with impressive quali-
fications in the fields of cardiology, aerospace medicine, and neurop-
sychology. The panel devised an extensive battery of physiological
and psychological tests as a basic protocol for assessing the fitness of
pilots over the age of sixty. In the petition to the FAA, the panel
stated that this protocol, if properly administered and supple-
mented, where appropriate, by additional medical tests and by the
existing operational tests required by the FAA and the airlines (such
as flight simulator testing), provided an adequate basis for exempt-
ing some older pilots from the age sixty rule.
Aman, 856 F.2d at 949.
1,2 Id. Interestingly, upon publishing a summary of the pilots' Petition for Ex-
emption, the FAA received "over 180 submissions from physicians, scientists,
Congressmen, pilots, professional organizations, companies and the FAA itself"
in response to the FAA's invitation for public comment. Id.
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achieved by uniform enforcement of the age sixty rule".93
Upon review, the Aman court divided the pilot-petition-
ers' argument into two separate claims.94 The first claim
pertained to the pilots' argument that pilots over sixty
who meet "the psychological and medical standards of the
petitioners' protocol, as well as FAA and airline opera-
tional testing standards, are no more likely to cause acci-
dents due to sudden incapacitation or undetected
deterioration of piloting skills than are pilots below the
age of sixty."'9 5 The court noted that such a claim re-
quired the pilots to show that "the FAA lacked substantial
evidence for a finding that strict enforcement of the age
sixty rule reduces age-related risks of incapacitation and
undetected deterioration of piloting skills." 96
In defense of the Age-60 Rule, the FAA argued that
age-related deterioration in skills and the corresponding
increased risks of incapacitation and error could not be
entirely screened out, even if the FAA coupled the sug-
gested health protocol with the existing operational
tests.97 The court noted the large number of sources
cited by the FAA supporting the enforcement of the Age-
60 Rule, including expert testimony indicating the height-
ened risk of physical deterioration among pilots which oc-
curred during the time span between the required bi-
annual medical examinations.98 The court then reviewed
the existence of evidence supporting the proposition that
neither the protocol set forth by the pilots nor the opera-




Id. In order to meet the "public interest standard" as set forth in the Federal
Aviation Act, the Aman court recognized the FAA's burden to identify some reduc-
tion in air carrier safety due to strict enforcement of the Age-60 Rule. Id.
97 Id. The court specifically noted the FAA's assertion that" '[blecause the like-
lihood of sudden death, disability, or incapacitation due to previously undetected
disease increases at an accelerating rate with each additional year of chronological
age, granting exemptions would compromise, by some amount, the current level
of safety.'" Id. (quoting FAA Denial of Exemption, No. 25,008 at 13 (Sept. 8,
1987)).
,- Id. at 952-53.
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capable of identifying or predicting the potential signifi-
cant losses on flying skills. 99
After evaluating the evidence supporting the FAA's
contentions, the Aman court addressed the pilots' "sup-
port for the contrary view that modern testing methods
can eliminate the risks associated with incapacitating ill-
ness and the loss of essential skills." 100 In addition to the
opinions rendered by the Age 60 Exemption Panel, the
pilots offered testimony from doctors, pilots, and other
organizations which supported the exemptions. 0 1 After
considering this evidence in light of the evidence submit-
ted by the FAA, the court stated that, with respect to
whether the requested exemptions would add any risk of
incapacitation or error due to the deterioration of piloting
skills, substantial evidence supported the FAA's conclu-
sions. 10 2 The court then concluded, with respect to the
to Id. at 953. In particular, the FAA relied upon the statement of a NASA scien-
tist specializing in research on human performance in flight, "who found no evi-
dence that objective reliable tests of cognitive function in a rich and rapidly
changing environment exist, let alone that they have been applied to or validated
in a pilot population of any age." (emphasis in original). Id.
-oo Id.
lot Id. at 953-54. The court also noted the pilots' criticism of the "methods,
analyses, and in some case,[sic] motives of the sources upon which the FAA re-
lied." Id. at 954. The court also acknowledged the pilots' claims "that the FAA's
position with respect to the fitness of pilots over sixty has been shaped by im-
proper influences." Id. at 954 n.7. In the submission to the court, the pilots
suggested
that the original [age sixty] rule may have been tainted by ex parte
communications between the FAA Administrator and the president
of a major airline .... that the FAA's abandonment of the 1982 pro-
posal to study the age sixty rule through selective exemptions was
influenced by ex parte communications with the Air Line Pilots As-
sociation and that the FAA's strict adherence to the age sixty rule
since 1960 reflects the FAA's hidden agenda - a concern for airline
costs rather than for passenger safety.
Id. Describing the pilots' claims as "thinly veiled allegations," the court noted
that the pilots had not proffered any factual support for the claims, other than
some handwritten notes taken by Frank Austin, written while Austin served as
Federal Air Surgeon, which characterizes "the rule as 'operational' or 'economic'
rather than medical." Id.
1'1 Id. at 954. Although the court held in favor of the FAA on the pilots' first
claim, the court emphasized that "[w]ere we to conduct a de novo review of the
docket, we might conceivably side with the petitioners. But [that] is not our job."
Id.
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pilot's first claim, that, "[w]hen the question is whether
the petitioners' protocol eliminates all of the incremental
risk associated with sudden incapacitation or undetected
deterioration of skills among pilots over sixty, a substan-
tial body of medical opinion continues 'to doubt the feasi-
bility' of the project."'10 3
In their second claim, the pilot-petitioners asserted that
an exemption must be granted because older pilots who
satisfy the protocol and existing operational tests are
more experienced and, hence, safer than the average pi-
lot. 0 4 With respect to this claim, however, the court em-
phatically stated: "[W]e find the FAA's rejection of the
petitioners' position far less persuasive."' 10 5
In its analysis, the court immediately noted the limited
amount of attention given this second claim by the FAA.
The court commented that the FAA's discussion of the is-
sue was considerably less than the response to which the
pilots were entitled. 1 6 Noting the lack of evidence sup-
o. Id.
' Id. at 954-55.
' Id. at 954.
Id. at 955. Specifically, the court emphasized that the FAA limited its discus-
sion of the effect of pilot experience on air safety and the Age-60 Rule to only two
paragraphs of the FAA's order denying the pilots exemption. The court quoted
the order as follows:
"The petitioners have failed to show that what they request is in the
public interest. The FAA does not agree that it is in the public inter-
est to [project that] an increase in safety will result from the use of
[the pilot-petitioners'] services as pilots beyond age 60, thereby out-
weigh[ing] the potential safety hazard to the public from increased
risk of an incapacitation and diminished performance. Petitioners
argue that the loss of experienced pilots to the airlines because of
retirements mandated by the Age 60 rule is resulting in a shortage of
pilots which is forcing the airlines to lower their standards and to
hire less experienced and qualified pilots. Thus, petitioners argue
that granting exemptions to the Age 60 rule would ease this
shortage and increase the level of safety. However, the exhibits
presented by the petitioners in support of this argument make it
clear that current lowering of minimum experience requirements at
some airlines is the result of a number of factors; including fewer
civilian pilot trainees, fewer pilots leaving the military, increasing
numbers of senior pilots retiring voluntarily before age 60, and the
expansion of the airlines after deregulation."
Id. (quoting FAA Denial of Exemption, No. 25,008 at 11).
porting the FAA's dismissal of the pilots' petition, the
court properly stated that the FAA failed "to present find-
ings of fact supported by substantial evidence (or even by
the presumably lesser quantum of evidence required to
avoid arbitrariness and capriciousness) or to identify the
governing principles and set forth a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made'." 107
In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed a wealth
of evidence offered by the pilots, including several com-
parisons of accident rates attributed to various age groups
for pilots with commercial and air transport certificates. 08
Admittedly, the court recognized that the data presented
did not make an "airtight" case for the pilots. Yet, the
court did emphasize that
the comparisons are at least suggestive; they warranted
something more than the FAA's summary dismissal of the
experience argument as based on mere supposition. The
FAA [did] address the petitioners' claim that rigid enforce-
ment of the age sixty rule reduces the average experience
level among active pilots. But [the FAA's] observation
that other factors have contributed to an overall decline in
experience has no apparent connection to the effect on
safety of refusing exemptions to particular older pilots.'0 9
Accordingly, the court deemed the FAA's consideration
of the pilots' petition "incomplete," noting the FAA's fail-
ure to state any factual or legal basis in support of its re-
jection of the pilots' claim that the increased level of
experience of the older pilots offsets the existence of any
undetected physical losses.III Thus, the court vacated the
FAA's denial of the pilots' petition and remanded the case
107 Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
108 Id. The court noted: "These data show below average accident rates for
pilots in the 55-year old to 59-year old age group and the 60-plus group (a group
that presumably piloted only flights not subject to the age sixty rule)." Id.
1-' Id.
1- Id. at 957. Interestingly, the court recognized the FAA's "increased willing-
ness in recent years to issue 'special' medical certificates ... to pilots otherwise
disqualified by episodes of heart disease or alcoholism," notwithstanding the
FAA's consistent refusal to grant pilots exemptions from the Age-60 Rule. Id.
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to the FAA for further proceedings to provide findings
and explanations addressing the deficiencies noted by the
court. " I
Following the Aman court's decision, the pilot-petition-
ers supplemented their initial petition with additional ex-
hibits and authorities.'" 2  In fact, over 200 scientists,
physicians, aviation industry officials, pilots, and other in-
terest organizations and individuals submitted comments
to the reopened public docket." t3
Despite the new evidence, the Director of Flight Stan-
dards Service, acting on behalf of the FAA, denied the pi-
lots' petition for exemptions on May 26, 1989."1'
In the denial, the FAA considered the pilots' argument
that the experience of pilots over the age of sixty out-
Il Id.
"2 Brief for Baker at 6, Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-
2524), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1388 (1991) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. The pro-
cedural history of the case merits some review. Subsequent to the submission of
the original petition (under examination in Aman v. FAA), Melvin Aman withdrew
his name as a petitioner. Denial of Exemption at 1, In the matter of Courtney Y.
Bennett, and John H. Baker, FAA Nos. 25,008 and 25,524 [hereinafter Denial of
Exemption].
, Petitioner's Brief, supra note 112, at 6. The petitioners contended that the
evidence submitted demonstrated that:
(1) in aviation, pilot experience enhances safety and, conversely, in-
experience has been responsible for fatal accidents; (2) the surge of
forced retirements at age sixty has been responsible, in part, for a
shortage of qualified experienced airline pilots and a reduction in
overall airline cockpit experience levels; (3) aviation industry experts
overwhelmingly and unanimously supported the view that experi-
ence is a critical factor in airline safety, for which there is no substi-
tute; (4) aviation accident statistics show that accidents decrease with
increasing age in airline operations and with increasing age and ex-
perience in general aviation; (5) FAA's increasing use of special ex-
emptions to permit pilots with serious disabilities, who are under
age 60, to return to airline flying strongly supports permitting pilots
over age 60 with no known disabilities to continue their service; (6)
petitioners' medical/psychological testing protocol, developed by a
qualified medical panel of experts, was unchallenged by the scientific
and medical community in its ability to screen pilots over sixty years
of age; and (7) advances in medical science, generally and as they
pertain to airline pilots, strongly support exemptions from the age
60 rule.
Id.
"' Denial of Exemption, supra note 112, at 33.
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weighed any increase in the risk of accidents due to pilot
incapacitation or deterioration of skills with age." 5 The
FAA quickly dismissed this argument, however, claiming
that any conclusions drawn from the data relied upon by
the pilots were "suspect." '" 6 The FAA further stated that
in spite of the advances in medical diagnosis, treatment
and prevention, some mental, psychomotor, emotional,
intellectual, and physical attributes necessary for en-
hanced flight crew performance nonetheless decline with
advancing age."17 The FAA contended that despite any
potential individual exceptions, the available data demon-
strated that the general population displayed an increas-
ing rate of disability and death as a result of physical
changes and disorders attributable to increasing age." 8
The agency also stated that the aging process involves a
vast number of variables, resulting in a high degree of un-
predictability and immeasurability.' 19 Hence, according
to the agency, the question of operating privileges for pi-
lots age sixty and over is not comparable to the question
of assessing younger airmen with specific medical condi-
tions. 20 The FAA claimed that the medically-exempt
younger pilots are not comparable to the sixty-and-over
pilots, as the person with the known disease can be tested
and assessed in order to identify and monitor a medical
condition. Accordingly, granting special medical exemp-
tions to pilots does not compromise safety and does not
demand similar consideration with respect to the Age-60
Rule.' 2 ' The agency alleged that exemptions are only
granted where specific medical conditions have been
identified, and only after the agency has been able to de-
velop a means of assessment and surveillance specifically
designed to indicate the individual pilot's capabilities and
I, ld. at 31-32.
Id. at 31.
17 Id. at 31-32.
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to identify any adverse changes. Medical certification is
not granted in situations where this is not possible. 22
The FAA concluded that such was not the case with aging.
The agency reasoned that medical tests that could ade-
quately determine which individual pilots are prone to
either acute cardiovascular or neurologically induced in-
capacitation or to any subtle adverse conditions related to
cognitive functioning are not presently available.
23
Hence, finding that the pilots had failed to provide sub-
stantiation for the granting of exemptions, the FAA de-
nied the pilots' petition for exemption.124
122 Id.
2-1 Id.
12- Id. at 32-33. As a foundation for its conclusion, the FAA relied heavily upon
the controversial "Flight Time Study" - an aviation accident experience analysis
broken down into specific age categories. Id. at 22. The data used in the Flight
Time Study covered the period 1976-1980. Id. According to the FAA, the Flight
Time Study "data base contains over 3 million 'pilot years' of flying during which
some 300 million pilot hours were flown. In that period, over 20,000 general
aviation accidents occurred, reports for the vast majority of which (perhaps 90
percent) contained the flight time data required for the study." Id. Even though it
relied heavily upon the Flight Time Study, the FAA recognized several sources of
potential inaccuracy, including the fact that the "accident rates in the 'Flight Time
Study' are understated by some 10 percent and are not directly comparable from
one category to the next." Id. at 23. The FAA also noted that
annualization of recent flight time data may also give rise to errors.
For example, a class 3 medical certification application records flight
time in the past 6 months. These flight hours are first doubled to
approximate a year's time and then redoubled since only half the
pilots holding class 3 medical certification were recertified that year.
An accident record, on the other hand, records flight time in the past
90 days and is quadrupled to obtain an estimate of the most recent
annual flight time by that pilot.
Id. Finally, the FAA recognized another weakness in that the pilot medical certifi-
cate application flight data, upon which it relied for the Flight Time Study, were
completely self-reported and not validated for the issuing official. Id. The FAA
commented:
These estimates are almost surely in error to some degree, though it
is difficult to see why they would substantially bias any study of acci-
dent rates as a function of age. As shown in the "Flight Time Study"
these data are more accurate than the minimum needed, although
comparison of age-specific accident rates calculated on the basis of
the recent flight time data subset will yield marginally different val-
ues when compared with rates based on the total flight time data
subset.
Id. Thus, despite these known areas of potential error, the FAA nonetheless re-
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The Seventh Circuit Reviews the Age-60 Rule Again: Baker v.
FAA
On July 21, 1989, thirty-one of the pilot-petitioners
filed a Petition of Review in the United States Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 5 On appeal, the petitioners
alleged that the FAA's denial of exemptions was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Among their seemingly
very valid arguments, the petitioners, in particular, at-
tacked the FAA's use of the Flight Time Study as the foun-
dation for its denial.' 26  The petitioners' contentions
lied upon the results of the Flight Time Study in denying the pilots' petition for
exemption.
In the Denial of Exemptions, the FAA stated that the results of the Flight Time
Study indicated that the lowest accident rate among pilots was that attributable to
pilots age 40-49, and that a "dramatic increase" in the risk of accident was seen
for pilots age 60-69. Id. at 25. An analysis of the data, the FAA stated
does not support petitioner's claim that experienced pilots beyond
the age of 60 have a low accident rate. In fact, their accident rate is
substantially higher than any younger age of similarly experienced
pilots who maintain medical certification which makes them eligible
to fly for the airlines. This analysis, while not solving the problem of
why this group of pilots experiences a higher rate of accidents, does
show that (for the period between 1976 and 1980) very experienced
pilots over the age of 60 who have obtained class I or class 2 medical
certification do experience substantially more accidents for each
hour they fly than younger pilots.
Id.
,12 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 112, at 2.
12I; ld. at 7, 9-17. The "Flight Time Study" upon which FAA relies is formally
entitled "The Influence of Total Flight Time, Recent Flight Time and Age on
Pilot Accident Rates." Id. at 9. Written by Richard Golaszewski, then of Acumen-
ics Research and Technology, Inc., the unpublished outside contact report was
completed in 1983. Id. According to the petitioners:
The Flight Time Study calculates accident rates in United States
general aviation by dividing the number of aircraft accidents in gen-
eral aviation for the years 1976-1980 by the number of hours flown
by pilots. Accident data were received from the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board's database, but excluded all accidents in air carrier
and commuter operations, the types of operations engaged in, or
most comparable to those engaged in, by petitioners. Flight Time
data were collected from "self-reported" pilot flight time submitted
on FAA medical examination forms.... The data. were reported for
holders of FAA pilot medical certificates for Class I (airline trans-
port, examinations taken every six months), Class II (commercial pi-
lot, taken every year), and Class III (general aviation and student
pilot, taken every two years). The accident rates reported were for
various age and experience levels and were broken down by pilots'
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regarding the use of the Flight Time Study were twofold:
(1) the portion of the report relied on by the FAA to show
an increase in the pilot accident rate above age sixty was
fatally flawed due to artificially depressed accident rates
for pilots below the age of sixty; and (2) the report as a
whole in fact showed a general decrease in pilot accident
rates with increasing pilot experience, and thus actually
supported the pilots' request for exemption from the Age-
60 Rule. 127
With respect to the Flight Time Study, the pilot-peti-
tioners claimed that the data used in calculating the acci-
dent rates for the pilots was "fatally flawed." '1 28 In fact,
the pilots alleged that the Flight Time Study reveals this
fatal flaw itself, as it acknowledges that airline and com-
muter pilots' accidents were excluded from the data compi-
lation, yet air carrier flight time was included.129 The pilots
alleged that the effect of including non-general aviation
flight time in a study devoted exclusively to general avia-
tion was to substantially reduce the accident rates for all
groups reporting such airline pilot hours. Since there are
no airline pilots over sixty years of age because of the
Age-60 rule, only the accident rates for Class I and Class
II pilots under age sixty are understated. 3 0 Importantly, pe-
titioners indicated that even the author of the Flight Time
Study recognized the statistical discrepancy caused by in-
cluding non-general aviation flight time in the denomina-
tor used to calculate the accident rate of pilots under the
"Total Flight Time" (cumulative lifetime experience), "Recent
Flight Time" (estimated annual hours flown), and "Total and Re-
cent Flight Time."
Id. at 10.
127 Id. at 9-10.
128 Id. at 13.
,211 Id. The petitioners alleged that over 95 million pilot hours of the total 300
million pilot hours represents the airline carrier flight time. Id.
,.,, Id. Petitioners noted that the accident rates for pilots under the age of 60
are calculated as the number of accidents in general aviation divided by the flight
time in general aviation plus air carrier operations. Id. at 14. Petitioners further
noted that while the accident rate for pilots over the age of 60 was calculated using
the same numerator (number of accidents in general aviation), the denominator
used presented only the flight time in general aviation. Id.
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age of sixty.' 3 ' Thus, because of this "fatal flaw" in the
study, the petitioners alleged that the accident rate among
pilots over age sixty is vastly overstated in relation to the
rates of the younger age groups, and that the FAA's reli-
ance upon and interpretation of the Flight Time Study
could afford no basis for denying exemption from the
Age-60 Rule. 132
The petitioners further contended that if the "fatal
flaw" in the Flight Time Study was disregarded, the re-
port in fact supports the granting of exemptions from the
Age-60 Rule.133 In support of this contention, petitioners
noted that: (1) accident rates declined with age if the
flawed groupings - those sixty and over - were disre-
garded; (2) dramatic reductions in accident rates occur at
all ages with increasing pilot experience; (3) in the only
class of general aviators not affected by the flaw in the
study, accident rates actually decreased with age; and (4)
by removing the flaw from the study, the accident rate for
general aviation pilots holds with age.' 34 Thus, the pilots
alleged that the "fatal flaw" in the data used in the Flight
Time Study is in fact fatal to the FAA's argument.
Despite the pilot-petitioners seemingly persuasive argu-
Id. Specifically, petitioners quoted the author as stating:
A fourth limitation to the data used [in the Flight Time Study] was
the inability to isolate only pilot hours flown in general aviation for
the assignment of accidents and hours flown to the classes used in
the study. For example, some air carrier pilots are engaged in per-
sonal flying in general aviation aircraft. It was impossible to account
for this and other similar factors. Thus, as noted above, the absolute
accident rates presented [in the Flight Time Study] are understated.Id.
32 Id. at 14. Interestingly, petitioners noted:
If all the accident rates in the report were reduced by the inclusion
of the same extraneous flight time in the denominator of the risk
equation, the relative rates among the age groups might still provide
useful comparative data. Thus, the accident rates for pilots in their
50's may still be compared to the younger age groups, because their
rates are all understated. In this regard, it is significant that the acci-
dent rate for the age group 50-59 is essentially equal to the age
group 40-49 - the safest of all age groups.
Id. at 14 n.15.
., Id. at 15-17.
1'4 Id.
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ments the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected peti-
tioners' claims and affirmed the FAA's decision to refuse
to grant the exemptions. 3 5 In its analysis, the court first
established that although the FAA's decision to deny the
exemptions must be supported by substantial evidence,
the petitioners actually had the burden of showing that
extenuating circumstances justified exemptions from the
Age-60 Rule, especially given the FAA's overwhelming
discretionary authority in this particular area. 3 6  The
court described the pilots' burden as "heavy," emphasiz-
ing the overarching public safety consideration. 1 7  The
court also noted the great difficulty facing the pilots to
demonstrate a clear conclusion with respect to the trade-
off between experience and possible age-related impair-
ment. 38 In fact, the court stated that such a task was "ex-
tremely onerous for the bearer of the burden of
persuasion." 139
The court then examined the evidence presented by the
pilots, noting that, although the pilots presented impres-
sive expert opinion as well as other anecdotal evidence,
they were unable to set forth a persuasive statistical analy-
sis comparing average risks for pilots in the various rele-
vant age categories. 140 The court noted that petitioners,





4 Id. at 319-20. The "anecdotal" evidence referred to by the court related to
specific, heroic acts performed by pilots in flight who were nearing the age of 60
at the time they performed their heroic deeds. The courts specifically noted the
actions of Captain Cronin,
who at age 59, on his second to last scheduled flight, heroically
landed a Boeing 747 en route from Honolulu, Hawaii to Auckland,
New Zealand after a forward cargo door blew open 17 minutes after
take off, opening a huge hole in the side of the plane. After two of
the plane's four engines became disabled, Captain Cronin consulted
emergency operating procedures which directed him to dive, reduce
speed and drop the landing gear. However, 38 years of experience
told him that, if that course were followed, the plane would lose too
much altitude given its weight and multiple emergency situation.
Captain Cronin instead operated many of the controls manually,
constantly readjusting his speed and altitude calculations. With the
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relying on data gathered by the National Transportation
Safety Board, presented evidence that pilots over age
sixty achieved a lower accident rate than pilots in the
other age groups. 4 '
Unfortunately, the court questioned the value of this
evidence, as it failed to account for exposure to risk in
terms of hours of flight time. 142 The court stated that the
data submitted by the petitioners afforded equal weight to
all pilots, irrespective of the number of hours flown by the
pilots in any one year. Because of this deficiency, the
court commented that the pilot-petitioners' evidence was
of "questionable value."'' 43 Moreover, the court empha-
sized the lack of any analysis demonstrating statistically
significant difference in accident experience by age and
noted that the pilot-petitioners had failed to indicate the
existence of a significant lack of pilot experience in need
of correction in the first place. 4 4
Interestingly, the evidence submitted by the FAA did
not escape harsh criticism by the court either. In fact, the
court emphasized that it did not find the FAA's evidence
any more persuasive than that offered by the pilots. The
court voiced its skepticism concerning the agency's heavy
reliance upon the Flight Time Study, which the court can-
didly admitted contained "serious flaws."' 45 The court
recognized that the study included millions of relatively
safe air carrier miles flown for those pilots under the age
of sixty, "miles which because of the age sixty rule were
unavailable to pilots over sixty.' 1 46 Because of this dis-
exception of the nine passengers killed when the cargo door blew
off, Cronin saved the lives of all passengers and crew aboard, safely
landing the disabled plane at a much higher than normal speed.
Id. Although the court recognized Cronin's heroic efforts, it did not place much
weight on the evidence as the pilots immediately before the court had not them-
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parity, the study significantly understates the accident
rates for all pilots under the age of sixty, as compared to
those pilots over the age of sixty.' 4 7 Perhaps the court
summarized the credibility of the Flight Time Study best,
when it stated that when "looking at the Flight Time
Study's chart of accident risk for Class I (airline transport)
and Class II (commercial) pilots with greater than 5,000
hours total flight time, the jump in accidents at age sixty
to sixty-nine from age fifty to fifty-nine simply looks too
large to be credible."' 4 8  The court also criticized the
FAA's attempt to show a link between automobile traffic
accidents and fatalities and those which occur in avia-
tion. 149  The court stressed that "[t]he connection be-
tween automobile drivers and pilots itself seems tenuous
given the pilots' training, demonstrated proficiency, medi-
cal fitness, etc. Some of the FAA's evidence does not re-
flect 'exposure' and some of it attempts to relate the
4 ld. at 320-21. Specifically, "the Flight Time Study divides the number of
general aviation accidents by general aviation flight time" in order to calculate the
accident rate for pilots age 60 and older. Id. at 320. However,
[b]ecause miles flown in air carrier operations are nearly accident
free, and millions of these extra miles are included in the figures for
younger pilots but not for older ones, the accident rate for all pilots
under age sixty is significantly understated compared to the rate for
older pilots, whose accident rate is overstated.
Id. at 320-21.
148 Id. at 321 (citation and footnote omitted). Interestingly, the court empha-
sized that "[elven without correcting the Flight Time Study for this disparity in
types of current flight hours, the FAA's own study on its face may in some aspects
be construed to support the petitioners' claims, the raw data supporting a number
of different possible conclusions." Id. The court viewed specific data for Class III
pilots (general aviation and students) showing accident rates as a function of total
recent flight time. Recognizing that the Flight Time Study segregated all of the
pilots into 10-year age intervals, the court pointed out yet another flaw in the
study, as such a presentation in fact skews the results of the Study.
The data indicated
that pilots age 60-69 (even 70 and over) with more than 1,000 hours
total flight time and more than 50 hours recent flight time appar-
ently have two of the lowest accident rates of any age groups of pi-
lots in class III having various indicated combinations of total and
recent flight time. These comparisons apply, of course, even with
respect to younger pilots in their thirties and forties, whose safety




nonparallel categories of automobile fatalities and aircraft
accidents." 150
The court then focused its attention on the Aman
court's directive commanding the FAA to justify granting
exemptions to younger pilots who had suffered from alco-
hol abuse, heart conditions and the like while refusing to
grant exemptions to apparently healthy and proficient pi-
lots over the age of sixty.' 5' In response to the Aman
court's directive, the FAA contended that particular medi-
cal examinations could be performed when specific, iden-
tifiable health problems were discovered. The agency
asserted, on the other hand, that " '[a]ssessing the risks
associated with determining which pilots may fly beyond
age 60 concerns detrimental conditions which are un-
known.' 152 Although the Baker court voiced its dissatis-
faction with this explanation, the court emphasized the
pilot-petitioners' inability to demonstrate the invalidity of
the agency's contention. 15 The court stressed that the pi-
lot-petitioners had not presented the FAA with a totally
reliable battery of tests which would demonstrate with
certainty any deterioration of piloting skills associated
with advancing age. 154
Although the majority rejected the pilot-petitioners' re-
quests, it did so with obvious remorse. In the latter part
of its opinion, the majority accurately described the pilots'
precarious position as a Catch-22, noting that on one
hand, the pilots cannot obtain exemptions until they can
demonstrate that they are capable of safely flying larger
passenger aircraft, while on the other hand, the pilots can-
not show that they can safely fly such planes until they
'uI Id. With respect to the evidence pertaining to automobile traffic accidents,
the court concluded that "[b]ecause elderly people seem more likely to die as a
result of traffic accidents than younger people, the probative value of this [evi-
dence] is diminished." Id.
-' Id.
12 Id.
,I ld. at 321-22.
"" Id. at 322.
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receive the exemptions. 55 Despite such recognition, the
majority denied the pilot-petitioners' claims, holding that
the pilots had failed to meet their burden of presenting
evidence that granting the exemptions would not impair
safety. 156
In its conclusion, the majority stated that the agency's
order denying the pilots' petition was in fact "supported
by substantial, albeit certainly not compelling, evi-
dence."'' 57 The majority itself emphasized that it was not
in the position to say that the numerous supporters of the
petitioners' case were wrong. 58  In fact, the majority
poignantly stated that "[t]he FAA should not take this as a
signal that the age sixty rule is sacrosanct and untoucha-
ble. Obviously, there is a great body of opinion that the
time has come to move on. The agency must give serious
attention to this opinion."' 59
Notwithstanding the majority's decision to uphold the
FAA's denial of the pilot-petitioners' exemptions, the dis-
sent expressed doubt as to the FAA's justification for con-
tinuing to uniformly deny all petitions for individual
exemptions from the FAA's overly rigid enforcement of
the Age-60 Rule. Upon noting that the FAA had never
--, Id. Due to this Catch-22 situation, the court noted that a valid statistical
demonstration comparing safety records by age would seem difficult to obtain
unless age groups were engaged in the same kinds of flying. Id. The court further
noted that, because the pilots over the age of 60 are not permitted to pilot large
passenger aircraft, any statistical comparisons are inherently suspect. Id.
'- Id. The Court emphasized that although the evidence presented did not
show that the granting of exemptions would increase the risk of accident, there
was no evidence which indicated that the experience of pilots over the age of 60
clearly outweighs the danger of deterioration of piloting skills or of sudden inca-
pacitation associated with the aging process. Id. The court thus concluded:
[w]here crucial issues of public safety are at stake, we would look for
such a showing. Were the FAA to grant exemptions, it (and we)
would no doubt be better able to resolve the question before us, but,
absent the requisite compelling evidence, we must defer in these cir-
cumstances to the expert agency.
ld.
I.7 Id. The majority reached "this conclusion because of the obvious difficulty
in attempting to balance on a statistical basis experience against reliable indica-
tors of good health and ability to perform as age advances." Id.
I. ld.
Id. at 322-23.
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granted an exemption to anyone (regardless of the pilot's
physical qualifications or experience), the dissent stated:
Pilots with tens of thousands of hours of flight time and
flawless records, and who pass every physical test with fly-
ing colors, suddenly are grounded on their sixtieth birth-
days, even though the day before they were flying, without
restrictions, and were acknowledged to be qualified and,
ironically, are still deemed qualified to pilot planes with
thirty passengers or less.' 60
After reviewing the FAA's traditional reasons for deny-
ing pilot petitions,' 6' the dissent addressed the Aman
court's decision to vacate the FAA's denial of the peti-
tions.' 62 Specifically, the dissent expressed confusion as
to exactly what the Aman court wanted the FAA to do
when the agency was to review the denial on remand. 63
The dissent noted the existence of a variety of tests
available and commonly used to ineasure the physical and
cognitive abilities of pilots, specifically mentioning flight
simulator tests, vision and depth perception tests, hearing
tests, blood tests, stress tests, and EKG's. 164 In light of
the battery of available tests, the dissenting judge re-
marked that he found it difficult to believe that skills and
physical or cognitive abilities existed which the FAA could
identify as vital for safe flying but for which it either could
"- Id. at 323 (Will, J., dissenting). Before moving into the remainder of his
argument, the dissent reviewed the history of the Age-60 Rule, noting in particu-
lar the FAAs justification of the Rule at the time of its adoption.
" Id. The dissent noted that the FAA continues to rely on the same justifica-
tions today as it did when the Age-60 Rule was first created in 1959. Id. The
dissent noted the two traditional reasons set forth by the FAA: (1) the notion that
emotional, psychomotor, intellectual and physical attributes necessary for flight
performance decline with age resulting in the deterioration of physical and cogni-
tive performance after the age of 60, and (2) the notion that, because a pilot's
skills began deteriorating at an increasing rate after the age of 60, the dangers of
these skills deteriorating to the point of sudden incapacitation is much greater at
age 60 and beyond, suggesting that there is no reliable way to distinguish a safe
60-year old pilot who won't suddenly collapse during flight from a pilot who will.
Id.
"d'-6 The dissent noted that the original denial reviewed by the Aman court con-
tained many of the same petitions on review in the case at hand. Id. at 324.
,- Id.
-~ Id.
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not or did not reliably test all pilots.' 65
The dissent also questioned how the FAA was supposed
to reconsider the relationship between experience, on one
hand, and physical skills and abilities, on the other hand,
especially in light of the fact that the Aman court found
"substantial evidence" to show that physical deterioration
could not be tested and measured accurately.' 66 The dis-
sent admitted that "balancing an intangible like experi-
ence against undetectable or unmeasurable deterioration
would be some trick."'' 67
The dissent also noted that a more serious difficulty
with the FAA's continuing reliance on a pilots' "sudden
incapacitation"'' 68 could be traced to the very foundation
of the FAA's argument. The dissent commented that the
"troubling problem with the FAA's 'sudden incapacita-
tion' justification [for the Age-60 Rule] is its premise." 169
The dissent argued that the court should first inquire
whether substantial evidence currently exists to support
the proposition that all pilots age sixty and older are sig-
nificantly more prone to sudden medical catastrophe than
are other pilots. 70 The dissenting judge contended that,
after all, the Age-60 Rule only makes sense if it screens for
risks that are significantly higher for all sixty-year-olds
than for pilots in other age groups. Otherwise, he cor-
rectly concluded, "the rule is simply an arbitrary, overly
broad and outmoded presumption, smelling of age dis-
"'i Id.
"- Id. at 324-25.
167 Id. at 325. The dissent noted that if, as a pilot grows older, experience off-
sets any decrease in skills and abilities, such an argument would logically depend
on two separate factors: (1) how much experience the particular pilot possesses,
and (2) how severely the pilot's physical skills and abilities have deteriorated. Id.
The dissent pointed out that the Aman court had previously concluded that the
second factor could not be measured with any degree of reliability. Id.
- The dissent defined "sudden incapacitation" as "the specter of a pilot in the
cockpit, of no matter what age, suddenly stricken by a heart attack or a stroke.
Id.
Iii Id.
170 Id. Additionally, the dissent criticized the Aman court for stating that current
medical technology could not determine which pilots over the age of 60 would be
most vulnerable to sudden incapacitation. Id.
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crimination, about infirmities which do not uniformly af-
flict our pilots over 60 and should not be assumed to.' ' 7'
The dissent then focused its attention on the Aman
court's instruction to the FAA to explain the FAA's in-
creased willingness to issue "special certificates" to pilots
under the age of sixty with records of heart disease, drug
abuse and alcoholism while simultaneously refusing to
grant exemptions from the Age-60 Rule. 172 In response
to the Aman court's directive, the FAA explained that
while current tests can predict the "expected course" of a
medical deficiency, such as alcoholism or heart disease,
with sufficient accuracy to afford valid, individualized
judgments, such accuracy is not in fact achievable when
assessing the "decrements" associated with the aging pro-
cess. 173 Importantly, the dissent noted that the FAA did
not offer "any evidence to support this distinction be-
tween the special certificates it grants to younger pilots
and its refusal even to promulgate meaningful regulations
and criteria for age exemptions for older pilots, much less
to grant an exemption to an older pilot."' 174 Hence, the
dissent criticized the majority for bowing to the agency's
unsupported contentions, even though the majority itself
admitted that it did not completely comprehend how the
FAA's distinction applied as a practical matter.175
Switching its focus to the record of the case, the dissent
then discussed the serious flaws inherent in the Flight
Time Study, noting again that the majority recognized




,,' Id. Furthermore, the dissent noted that the FAA set forth no citation in sup-
port of the proposition that the symptoms associated with alcoholism, drug abuse,
and heart disease could be monitored more reliably than the "decrements" asso-
ciated with aging. Id.
175 Id. at 325-26. The dissent particularly criticized the majority's holding that
it would not require the FAA to address the paradox of allowing pilots under the
age of 60 suffering from heart disease, alcohol abuse, and drug abuse to pilot
aircraft, while forcibly grounding those pilots age 60 and older, whose records
and physical condition, by contrast, are impeccable. Id.
17,i The dissent specifically noted two flaws inherent in the Flight Time Study
19921 789
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dissent also noted that the FAA analysis showing the rela-
tionship between automobile and airline traffic accident
fatalities as a function of age constituted weak evidence.
Accordingly, the dissent agreed with the majority's find-
ing that the connection between automobile drivers and
pilots is tenuous at best.' 7 7
Importantly, the dissent also agreed with the majority's
view that the pilot-petitioners faced a Catch-22 situa-
tion. ' 78 The dissent, however, gave more weight than did
the majority to the pilot-petitioners' accounts of pilots
who on the verge of turning sixty years of age performed
heroic deeds and thus saved many lives in situations
where a less experienced pilot might have failed.' 79 The
dissent also recognized the wealth of expert opinion evi-
dence asserting that experienced pilots over the age of
sixty are in fact qualified to fly large commercial aircraft,
and moreover, may even be better qualified than their
younger, less experienced colleagues." 0 Furthermore,
the dissent stressed the importance of the statistics sup-
plied by the National Transportation Safety Board indi-
cating that pilots aged sixty and older show a lower
accident rate than pilots in other age groups.' 8 1 Conse-
quently, the dissent chastised the majority for concluding
that (1) the FAA presented "substantial evidence" sup-
porting the Age-60 Rule, even though the majority itself
admitted that it had seen no compelling evidence indicat-
ing that the granting of exemptions would increase the
that were also recognized by the majority: (1) various experts, including some
representing the FAA, stated that the Study could not be relied on as determina-
tive or probative with respect to the continued validity of the Age-60 Rule; and (2)
the Study may in some aspects be construed so as to support the pilots' claims. Id.
For a discussion of the alleged flaws of the Flight Time Study, see supra notes 124-
34 and accompanying text.
177 Id. For further discussion of the automobile accident analogy, see supra notes
149-50 and accompanying text.
17H Id. On the majority's "catch-22" characterization, see supra notes 159-60
and accompanying text.
179 Id.; see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
I -) Id.
'8 Id. For further discussion on the majority's treatment of the NTSB statistics,
see supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
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risk of accident, and (2) it had seen no strong evidence
demonstrating that the experience of the age sixty-and-
over pilot clearly outweighed the danger of deteriorating
pilot skills that are associated with age. 182 The dissent
further held that the FAA's strict adherence to the Age-60
Rule effectively implies that every airline pilot on his or
her sixtieth birthday, irrespective of physical condition or
experience, becomes a significantly greater safety hazard
than he or she was just the day before. The dissent poign-
antly concluded, "[t]he evidence in this case does not war-
rant [such a] conclusion. Nor does everyday, ordinary
good old common sense."' 8 3
Thus, the dissent advocated vacating the FAA's order
and remanding the action on three separate fronts. First,
the dissent suggested that the FAA adopt "regulations es-
tablishing ascertainable and meaningful standards to gov-
ern the granting of at least some exemptions to the age 60
rule." ' 8 4 The present FAA regulations, the dissent con-
cluded, do not sufficiently guide the agency in exercising
its available discretion. In fact, the dissent went so far as
to criticize the current FAA regulations as constituting a
fraud.' 85
Second, the dissent would remand for a showing by
"current and substantial evidence" that all pilots age sixty
and older are "significantly more prone to 'sudden inca-
pacitation' than all pilots under the age of sixty.' 8 6 The
dissent recommended a reevaluation of the relevant data
so that the agency could articulate a satisfactory explana-
tion rationally related to the facts presented, as opposed
to continually relying on "sudden incapacitation" as its
support for the Age-60 Rule.8 7
Finally, the dissent suggested remanding the case so
that the FAA could supply a full and reasoned explanation
1.2' Id.
1-~ Id.
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for treating requests for special medical exemption certifi-
cates differently than petitions for exemptions from the
Age-60 Rule.' 88 The dissent advocated requiring the
agency to consider the possibility of requiring pilots age
sixty and older to undergo more frequent skill and medi-
cal examinations than pilots below the age of sixty. 18 9
Noting that the agency already performs such testing for
pilots granted special medical exemptions, the dissent
suggested that such testing may provide the agency with
sufficient, accurate, up-to-date data pertaining to a pilot's
health.' 90 This would enable the agency to make in-
formed, individualized determinations concerning a pi-
lot's flying ability, rather than arbitrarily and capriciously
denying exemptions to all.' 9'
CONCLUSION
Since its enactment over thirty years ago, the Age-60
Rule has continually been the target of extreme scrutiny
from both the aviation and legal community. Despite this
seemingly endless onslaught of attack, the Age-60 Rule
remains fully intact to this day.
In support of this somewhat antiquated doctrine, the
FAA continually urges public safety as the overarching ra-
tionale for maintaining strict adherence to its "60 and
out" policy for pilots. The FAA historically relies on the
premise that certain emotional, psychomotor, intellectual
and physical attributes required for flight performance
decline with age, and cannot be reliably tested, thereby
exposing the public to an increased risk of accident.
Ironically, the agency's continual reliance may actually
lead to the eventual demise of the Age-60 Rule, as the
growing body of evidence indicates that current medical
technology can in fact detect the deterioration which af-
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necessary for safe flying. Unfortunately, no court has yet
given this evidence the weight it deserves, and until courts
begin to do so, each pilot will be forced to retire upon
reaching his or her sixtieth birthday, even though any one
of these experienced pilots might indeed be the safest in
the air.

